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RINGKASAN
Saat ini, Indonesia telah berada pada tahun ketiga dari pelaksanaan desentralisasi.
Perubahan yang sangat besar, yang sering kali disetarakan dengan fenomena ‘big bang’
mengawali transfer aset, pegawai dan dana kepada pemerintah daerah sebagai
kompensasi dari tambahan kewenangan dan fungsi yang harus mereka laksanakan.
Meskipun ukuran dan kecepatan perubahan struktur-struktur formal sangat luar biasa,
tampaknya penyesuaian tata-hubungan non-formal akan berjalan lambat. Masih
sangat banyak permasalahan yang sifatnya konseptual maupun yang praktikal,
sedangkan jalannya perubahan terus menerus dipengaruhi oleh perubahan perilaku,
persepsi dan harapan terhadap proses desentralisasi. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian
lapangan yang telah dilakukan SMERU, tulisan ini menyoroti dinamika pelaksanaan
desentralisasi di tingkat daerah dan isu-isu yang penting untuk mendapat perhatian.
Temuan dari penelitian-penelitian tersebut memberikan gambaran bagaimana proses
desentralisasi mempengaruhi evolusi tata-pemerintahan di tingkat daerah, meskipun
perubahan tersebut masih pada tahap sangat dini. Disamping temuan yang sifatnya
umum, tulisan ini juga secara khusus membahas permasalahan yang berkaitan dengan
penganggaran, partisipasi masyarakat dan koordinasi antar tingkat pemerintahan
yang dihadapi oleh dua daerah yang relatif miskin, yaitu Lombok Barat dan Kota
Bandar Lampung, khususnya dalam kaitan dengan penyelenggaraan pelayanan
publik.  Meskipun kemajuan yang dicapai di daerah tertutupi oleh berbagai macam
permasalahan yang timbul, setiap bentuk kemajuan perlu mendapat pengakuan
sehingga memungkinkan diberikannya upaya khusus guna meningkatkan tata-
pemerintahan di daerah.
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ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s decentralization reform is now in its third year of implementation. The
‘big bang’ start marked the transfer of resources –assets, personnel and finances- to
the regions to compensate for the added authorities and functions.  While the speed
and size of the changes to formal structure have been phenomenal, the adjustment of
non-formal institutional settings is likely to take a long time. Many conceptual and
practical problems remain and the path to reform is continuously driven by an
evolutionary change in the practices as well as in the perception and expectation of
decentralization. Drawing from SMERU field research, this paper highlights the
dynamics of the implementation of decentralization reform at the local level and
some related issues and concerns. Although this reform is still in the preliminary
stages, the findings of these studies show how the reform process has influenced the
evolution of governance at the local level. In addition to the general findings, special
attention is devoted to the problems of budget allocation, community participation
and intergovernmental coordination faced by two resource-poor regions –West
Lombok and Bandar Lampung (City)– in relation to the provision of public services.
Although the progress at the local level might have been overshadowed by many
problems, any progress certainly needs to be acknowledged to allow local governance
to strengthen.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s decentralization reform is now in its third year of implementation.  This
reform, which was hoped would facilitate better resource allocation and better
governance, does not yet seem to have delivered significant benefits.  Just like many
other developing countries undergoing decentralization, the political factors that
drive Indonesia’s attempts at decentralization have overlooked technical and
economical problems. The general view, as recorded in various studies, seemed to
prefer an ‘implement first and deal with the problem latter’ approach.1 So, despite
much criticism of some of the decentralization framework contained in the two laws
pertaining to the new regional autonomy setting and new intergovernmental fiscal
relations, these laws were made effective as of 1st January, 2001.
A major transfer of assets and personnel and the implementation of a new system of
fiscal transfer immediately followed the “big-bang” start.2 This may have been the
right choice given the long time reluctance of the central government to devolve real
authority to regional governments during the New Order Era. However, the
implication of this choice was the potential emergence of problems that could have
been anticipated beforehand. Another consequence is the need to continuously
revise decentralization frameworks, some of which involve fundamental issues.
Revising these frameworks is likely to be a very challenging process, given the path
dependence of such reform
By its nature, Indonesia’s attempt at democratic decentralization is a very big
institutional reform that affects not only the intergovernmental relations, but also
the way all levels of government interact with the community. The experiences of
other countries show that this kind of transition could take a very long time and, by
any means, Indonesia is still very much in the early stage of this transition. The main
problem for Indonesia is that the decentralization process was started during the
course of a deep social, political and economic crisis, when the expectation of the
community to come out of the crisis as soon as possible was very high.
Unfortunately, this is something that might not be able to be delivered by the
current reform process.  Two differing expectations –quick results or an evolutionary
institutional development– shape the current debate on the performance of
decentralization reforms. More and more problems are now being widely exposed,
while the positive impacts seem very limited, or are not well exposed. However, the
ball is already rolling and there might not be time to debate the pessimistic and the
optimistic views.  This is the time for objectively assessing the progress and problems
so that the reform process can achieve its primary aims.
                                                
1 This perception dominated the debate over the choice between implementing the Law 22/1999 on
Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Center and the Regional
Government as it is, although many analyses found many loopholes in these laws, or delay the
implementation of these laws to allow for more public debate and revision. This was recorded among
others in Suharyo (2000).
2 Hofman (2002) used this term to illustrate the speed and the size of the reform during its initial
period.
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In an effort at such an assessment, this paper depicts some findings from SMERU
field studies over the course of the 2000-2002 period that observed the preparation
and the implementation of decentralization at the local level.  The SMERU research
team has visited a total of 16 regencies and 2 cities for studies on decentralization and
regional autonomy (Appendix 1).3 In each location, information was gathered
primarily through semi-structured in-depth interviews. The respondents included
officials at all levels of government, as well as representatives of political parties and
civil society institutions (including community organizations, NGOs, the press,
professional bodies, religious leaders, local-level traditional leaders, village heads and
members of village-level committees).
The locations of these studies were selected to reflect the condition of most regions
throughout Indonesia, taking into account their per capita gross regional domestic
product (GRDP), as well as human development and poverty conditions. The
resource rich regions were intentionally omitted from the sample for two reasons.
Firstly, only a few regions actually have abundant natural resources. Secondly, lots of
studies have been done in these regions. This limited scope in SMERU’s studies does
not allow for contrasting the resource rich against the resource poor regions as
requested in the term of reference of this seminar. However, findings of these studies
have provided some insights into the dynamics of the implementation of
decentralization reforms at the district level.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section presents some local perceptions
and experiences during the pre-implementation period and the early phase of the
reform process.  The following section presents, some examples on the changes with
regards to budget condition, community participation and intergovernmental
coordination mechanism using experiences from West Lombok and the city of
Bandar Lampung.
                                                
3 The field reports of each study are available at www.smeru.or.id.
The SMERU Research Institute, June 20033
THE DYNAMICS OF THE REFORM PROCESS
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Indonesia has already passed the critical first year of the implementation of
decentralization reform without experiencing any upheavals or major disruption to
public services.4 However, one should not be over confident with this “success” as it
does not guarantee that the expected long-term benefit of the decentralization reform
will be realized.  The implementation process was not smooth or well managed, and
lots of confusion and uncertainties were involved. The calculation of the block grant
allocation for the regions, for example, was done ahead of the transfer of personnel
and assets.  This resulted in a fiscal gap in most regions that was financed through a
contingency mechanism.  There was also a lack of sufficient guidance from the center
and many implementation regulations were not yet available. On the other hand,
some contradictions and inconsistencies of various implementation regulations have
also created more confusion. These shortcomings have affected preparation and
implementation at the regional level and were reflected in the perception of various
stakeholders collected by the SMERU research team during field studies.
Local Perception in the Pre-Implementation Period
During the pre-implementation period, the SMERU team visited five regencies and
two cities that were located in seven different provinces.  Despite the variation of the
district5 characteristics, it seemed that there was a common perception with regard to
decentralization and the implementation of the new form of regional autonomy.
There was widespread enthusiasm towards decentralization, although the level of
preparation taken by local government was varied. There were also common
complaints on the slow progress and lack of leadership from the central government.
In general, the regional government at the district level did not have any objection
to the framework of regional autonomy contained in Law 22/1999 and 25/1999.
They were only questioning the political will of the central government to
implement it.  On the other hand, at the provincial level, there was much concern
regarding the elimination of the hierarchical relationship between provincial and
district governments.
Interestingly, despite general support for the implementation of the new
decentralization framework, some concerns over its potential adverse impacts were
expressed. The most common concern of government officials was regarding the
transfer of money from the central government. They worried that the transfer would
not be sufficient to finance the new authorities and functions being devolved to the
regions and raising local revenue would be very hard, particularly with the limitation
of regional taxes imposed by Law 18/1997. Non-government elements expressed their
concerns of local government failure to perform their new roles, primarily due to lack
of the local parliament’s and local officials’ capabilities, and the potential
                                                
4 Deutser (2002).
5 The term “district” is used to represent both regency and city, or the level of government that was
known as government level 2 in the previous system.
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proliferation of corruption at the local level.  They also doubt that the local
government would pay enough attention to the provision of public services.
Experiences and Perception after the Implementation
After the new decentralization laws were made effective on 1st January, 2001, the
SMERU team visited 12 regencies, 10 regencies in 2001 and the other two in 2002.
Although only one district, West Lombok, was visited before and after
decentralization, there was a strong impression that the perception of various local
stakeholders regarding decentralization and the implementation of the new regional
autonomy was similar.  Most stakeholders in the regions visited raised some common
issues and concerns.
It was quite interesting to see that the concerns regarding the adequacy of fiscal
transfer, the capability of district government and the potential proliferation of
corruption at the local level, which were expressed during the pre-implementation
period were founded.  With regard to fiscal transfer, starting in the 2001fiscal year,
the central government has made substantial increases in block grant to the regions,
particularly to the district level.  In all districts visited, the amount transferred from
the central government had increased significantly (See Table 1), but the general
perception of the local government was that the increase was not enough to
compensate for the increasing expenditure, particularly due to the transfer of
personnel.
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Table 1.  Changes in Various Sources of District Government Revenue
Transfer from the Central
Government District Government Revenue
 District   1999/2000* 2001**
Change
(%) 1999/2000 2001
Change
(%)
(Billion Rp.) (Billion Rp.)
Banjarmasin (City) 72.3 159.9 121 12.9 18.8 46
Bolmong 70.0 151.8 117 2.3 8.1 255
Gorontalo 91.8 156.6 71 2.4 6.4 168
Karo 68.3 101.0 48 7.1 4.7 (34)
Kudus 66.8 194.6 191 11.9 22.1 86
West Lombok 86.4 184.1 113 14.6 18.4 25
Magetan 91.7 225.9 146 5.6 17.7 215
Minahasa 13.8 277.4 1,910 7.4 9.5 28
Sukabumi (City) 48.6 97.0 100 8.3 13.2 60
Sanggau 84.3 206.4 145 1.7 3.8 117
Solok 87.9 159.8 82 2.8 5.1 80
Simalungun 13.9 298.3 2,046 5.0 11.8 135
Deli Serdang 159.1 379.2 138 10.9 27.0 148
East Sumba 34.5 129.9 277 1.5 3.8 156
Bandar Lampung (City) 79.9 190.4 138 13.8 23.7 71
** Consists of DAU (Block grant) and Revenue Sharing.
This perception might be justified, since the transfer of personnel and the expansion
of local government structure let to significant increase of the budget for salary
payment and routine expenditure. Table 2 shows that salary payments have increased
by more than 100% in all regions included in the study, and that the increase at the
provincial level was much higher than the increase at the district level.  In North
Sumatra, for example, salary expenditure increased by more than 300%.
The increase in routine expenditure was partly due to the over expansion of the local
government that was used to accommodate the excess number of personnel.  As can
be seen in Table 3, in 7 out of 9 districts where data on the changes in local
government structure were collected, the number of working units was increased.
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However, in one region, Simalungun in North Sumatra, the number of unit was
trimmed down from 39 to 28.
Table 2.  Salary Payment before and after Decentralization (Billion Rp.)
Before AfterNo. Province/District
1999/2000 2001
Change (%)
A. Province
1.North Sumatera          64.1 269.5             321
2.Lampung 43.8            127.8             192
3.North Sulawesi 34.8 78.7             126
4.East Nusa Tenggara 29.0 103.9             258
5.West Nusa Tenggara 25.6 90.9             255
B. District
1.Karo*) 30.7 81.0             164
2.Bandar Lampung (City) 55.5 149.5             170
3.Minahasa 102.7 207.5             102
4.Bolaang Mongondow 47.2 89.1               89
5.Sumba Timur 20.8 56.1             170
6.Gorontalo 60.3 125.5             108
7.Cirebon 85.2 215.8             153
8.Garut 117.0 299.0             155
9.Ciamis             109.3             271.4             148
10.West Lombok 47.8 123.9             159
*) Before decentralization using data on FY 2001 adjusted to reflect 1 year budget.
Sources: Regional Government Budget and www.djpkpd.go.id.
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Table 3.  Number Of District Government Unit before and after Decentralization
District Before After Change
1. Minahasa 20 34 14
2. Bolaang Mangondow 16 25 9
3. Gorontalo 13 25 12
4. Banjarmasin 25 33 8
5. Sanggau 18 25 7
6. Magetan 22 26 4
7. Kudus 16 16 0
8. Karo 15 19 4
9. Simalungun 39 28 -11
  Source: SMERU Field Reports.
Another source of the widespread increased in routine expenditure was the increase
in the salaries of the members of the local assemblies (DPRD).  From some regions
where data is available, DPRD salaries increased by more than 200% (Table 4) and
in the province of West Sumatra they increased by more than 400%.
Table 4.  The Increase in the Salary of DPRD Members
Region Change (%)
1. Province North Sumatera 300
2. Simalungun 250
3. Province West Sumatera 460
4. Solok 250
5. West Lombok 330
6. Province of Lampung 286
7. City of Bandar Lampung 265
Source: SMERU Field Reports
The pseudo increase in the fiscal capacity of the regions after decentralization has
forced regional governments to increase revenue themselves. The consequence has
been an increase in the number of taxes and levies imposed by regional government,
particularly after the amendment of Law 18/1999. Interestingly, various interviews
revealed that most people, including some officials and DPRD members, were aware
that most taxes would potentially have negative impacts on regional trade and
investment as well as impose more of a burden on local communities. However, it
seems that many decision-makers simply neglected this argument, or were driven
more by private interests. Although it emerged slowly, more and more professional
groups, associations, and non-government organizations have now begun to pressure
local governments to produce more reliable regulations.
The concerns from various elements in local communities regarding the potential
proliferation of corruption at the local level have also proved founded. Election of
regional leaders, budget allocations and the selection of project implementers were
among the most common sources of corruption. Along with the increasing power of
the DPRD, it was widely criticized that some members of the DPRD were corrupt,
The SMERU Research Institute, June 20038
adding to the previous number of corrupt officials. There was also widespread
skepticism regarding the capability and capacity of the DPRD to have a positive
influence on the performance of local governments.
These problems have triggered various forms of public participation, although most of
them are still at an embryonic stage. There has been increasing involvement by local
universities and non-government organizations in both monitoring and control
processes as well as, to a lesser extent, involvement in the decision-making process.
Local press has also played a greater role in voicing the aspirations of the community
as well as facilitating stronger monitoring of the conduct of the local government.
The fact that inclusion of public participation in decision making still has many
weaknesses cannot be neglected. The formation of a “City Council” in Banjarmasin
that includes some non-government organizations, for example, was perceived to be
superficial.6 However, it appears that there had been some efforts to end the long-
standing exclusion of communities in the matters that were perceived to be
“government affairs” under the previous regime.
                                                
6 See Toyamah N. et. al (2002) page 20.
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THE CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING PUBLIC
SERVICES: THE CASE OF WEST LOMBOK AND
BANDAR LAMPUNG
In theory, decentralization brings governments closer to the people. Thus, the
provision of public services becomes more effective and efficient. However,
international experiences reveal that there is no direct relationship between
decentralization and a better provision of public services or pro-poor development.7
The local political and institutional settings potentially determine the end result.
The design of the decentralization process and the role of the central government in
assisting local governments that have limited capabilities can, however, play
important roles.  This section looks at these issues by examining three important
elements of the provision of public services –budgeting, community participation and
coordination- in two relatively resource-poor regions, West Lombok in West Nusa
Tenggara (NTB) and Bandar Lampung in Lampung, Sumatra. Although the social
economic conditions in Bandar Lampung are better than in West Lombok, both are
relatively poor by national standard.
Table 5.  Basic Statistics of West Lombok and Bandar Lampung
 West Lombok Bandar Lampung
Area (km2)                          20,153                               192
Population, 2000                        663,789                        743,109
Population Density, 2000                               381                            3,870
Per Capita GRDP, 1999 (thousand Rp.)                               852                            1,952
Poverty Rate (%)                            36.60                            10.00
HDI, 1999                            49.90                            68.50
HPI, 1998                            39.00                            20.50
Sources: SMERU Field Reports and BPS-Bappenas -UNDP (2001).
Local Budget and the Financing of Service Centers
After the implementation of Law 25/1999, West Lombok and Bandar Lampung
received significantly higher transfer from central government.  Compared to the
1999/2000 fiscal year (FY), the transfer to West Lombok increased by 105% from Rp.
90 billion to Rp.184 billion and the transfer to Bandar Lampung increased by 139%
from Rp.80 billion to Rp.191 billion. At the provincial level, both NTB and
Lampung received an increase of around 77% each.  Along with the increase in local
revenue, West Lombok, Bandar Lampung and the province of Lampung enjoyed an
increase in its total revenue of more than 100% in the 2001 FY, compared to the
1999/2000 FY.  NTB experienced a lower increase of 91% during the same period.
However, the largest portion of the revenue still came from the central government
in the form of block grants (DAU-Dana Alokasi Umum).
                                                
7
 See, for example Anwar (1998), Kahkonen and Lanyi (2001), MDGD-UNDP (1999) and World
Bank (1999).
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Nevertheless, the routine expenditure of the four regions increased at a higher rate.
The increase in West Lombok was around 137%, in Bandar Lampung 153% percent,
in NTB 267% and in Lampung 127%. This limits the ability to increase the budget
allocation for development expenditure. Consequently, although in nominal terms
the amount allocated to development increased, the proportion of development
spending to total expenditure decreased. As can be seen in Table 7, each region
allocated their budget differently across sectors.  Compared to the 1999/2000 fiscal
year, Bandar Lampung spent less on education but spent more on the health sector.
At the provincial level, Lampung spent more on both education and health.  On the
other hand, West Lombok spent more on education but less on health, and at the
provincial level, NTB spent more on health and less on education.
Table 6.  Revenues of West Lombok, Bandar Lampung, Lampung Province and
NTB before and after Decentralization (million Rupiah)
West Lombok Bandar Lampung NTB Lampung 
 1999/2000 2001 1999/2000 2001 1999/2000 2001 1999/2000 2001
Total Revenue 109,385 223,265 97,192 231,199 187,412 358,973 222,356 453,333
Previous Year
Surplus     4,920 9,767     3,383    6,531   20,491  19,197   10,265 31,644
Regional Revenue    14,556   18,361    13,823   23,697    35,679   66,545    57,904 148,064
Transfer from
Central Government 89,909 184,256 79,986 191,148 127,603 227,151 154,187 273,625
  Tax and Non-Tax
Share 6,273 18,863 8,728 31,057 7,546 104,844 11,711 93,322
  Subsidy and
Development Fund 83,585 - 71,257 - 120,056 - 142,476 -
  DAU (Block
Grant) - 165,095 - 159,412 - 122,307 - 180,303
  DAK (Specific
Grant) - 298 - 679 - - - -
Other Receipts           51   10,881 -     9,824 - 46,081 -
Local Government
Borrowing - - - 3,639 - -
Source: calculated from www.djpkpd.go.id.
A more critical question is whether local governments are able to finance service
provision centers so that the quality of services is at least the same as they were in the
pre-decentralization period. People directly engaged in the provision of health and
education services indicated that it is unlikely.  A primary school in Bandar Lampung
explained that in the pre-decentralization period they received an annual operational
allowance of Rp.2 million per year, but now only receive Rp.400.000. An open junior
high school (SLTP terbuka) in Bandar Lampung also relayed a similar story.
Previously, this school received an operational allowance of Rp.1 million per month,
but since the implementation of regional autonomy they receive Rp.1 million every 3
months.  This decrease has not directly reduced the quality of teaching as the teacher
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is paid out of routine post that remains at the same level, but the has also resulted in
the deterioration of school infrastructure since there are not enough funds for
maintenance. One of the reasons for these decreases was the additional expenditure
assignment on the education sector at the local level. Local governments are now
responsible for secondary schools, which used to be under the authority of provincial
government.  In addition, during pre-decentralization period, primary school also
received additional funding from various central government programs.
The situation in the health sector is similar.  A public health center (Puskesmas) in
Bandar Lampung, which used to receive an operational allowance of Rp.45.7 million
per year, now only receive Rp.50,000 per moth or Rp.600,000 per year. Another
Puskesmas in West Lombok now receive around Rp.15 million per year, whereas
previously it received around Rp.50 million.  This reduction forced the Puskesmas to
consider the alternative of increasing charges, but this has not yet been implemented
because there were fears of a negative reaction from the community.  However, the
burden for Puskesmas has been somewhat lightened by the continuous supply of
medicines and vaccines from the central and provincial governments.
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Table 7.  Government Expenditure of West Lombok, Bandar Lampung, Lampung
Province and NTB Before and after Decentralization (Million Rupiah)
 West Lombok  Bandar Lampung  NTB  Lampung
 1999/2000 2001  1999/2000 2001  1999/2000 2001  
1999/200
0 2001
TOTAL EXPENDITURE     96,331  200,233     94,391  220,675   165,384  312,714   207,597  356,789
ROUTINE EXPENDITURE       62,083    147,504     71,044    180,070       59,547    218,453   103,195    234,388
(%) OF TOTAL           64            74            75            82            36            70            50            66
Belanja Pegawai       49,642    120,336     55,926    146,086       28,595      90,856     43,777    127,789
(%) of Total            52            60            59            66            17            29            21            36
DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURE       44,306      52,729       23,347      40,605     105,836      94,261   104,402    122,400
(%) OF TOTAL             46               26                25                18            64               30            50            34
Industry            127           405         436             52            526           484       1,151           869
Agriculture and Forestry         1,724        3,242          606           288         3,435        6,086     10,258        7,834
Water resources and Irrigation            270        2,638 - -         7,662        1,671       8,681      15,003
Labor              88           105        50 -            317           108          205           816
Trade, Finance, Commerce and
Cooperative         3,075        2,612         1,461        1,077       12,796        8,269       1,349           620
Transportation         6,031        9,275         6,015        9,190       37,760      14,802     40,815      36,819
Mining and Energy              30           239 -             26            254           761      175           813
Tourism and
Telecommunication            313           938             26             30            800        1,015 590           597
Regional Development and
Settlement         5,169        3,833         2,560        8,850         1,527        2,084       1,195        2,799
Environment and Spatial         2,703           672          615           989         4,914        2,956       3,946        2,095
Education, Culture, Youth and
Sport         3,259        5,072         3,208        1,335         5,973        4,938       6,561      11,195
Demography and Family
Welfare            310           126 385        1,564              82             38 -           218
Health, Social welfare,
Women, Children and Youth         6,192        4,535           492        2,512         6,826      10,748 6,008      17,077
Housing and Settlement         9,672        1,099         3,274        7,549         1,484        2,153 1,849              -
Religion Affair            144           475          315         570            999        4,097        711        1,381
Science and Technology            362        1,138         1,072        1,524         1,837        2,495 2,358        1,425
Laws            103           159          150             30            162           394          20           614
Civil Servants and Control         4,105      14,983         2,032        4,790       14,024      23,541 14,574      19,666
Politics, Information,
Communication and Mass
Media            590           474             40           192         2,029        6,931 250           580
Security and Public Order              39           711          585             36            542           692 495        1,980
Source: calculated from www.djpkpd.go.id.
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The Challenge of Developing Participatory Mechanism
The failure of the current political parties system as well as the accountability
mechanisms has raised the importance of public participation, particularly in decision
making and monitoring. Between the two districts, the community and the
government of Bandar Lampung seems to be more dynamic, possibly because of the
urban environment and the proximity to university. Bandar Lampung has
experimented with participatory mechanisms, while there was no specific
information on such initiatives in West Lombok.8
There are two kinds of mechanism that have been developed in Bandar Lampung,
bottom-up planning at the kelurahan (village) level and participatory development
planning. However, each of these initiatives faces challenges. A team called TPPK
(Village Team for Development Planning) was formed at the village level to conduct
the bottom-up planning. The members of TPPK are elected directly by the local
community based on area of residence and government officials at the village and
kecamatan (sub-district) levels are not eligible for the election. The discussion forum
used in this process is similar to the old mechanism used for village discussions
established by the New Order Government. The difference is that, instead of the
village head and other medium-level officials dominating the forum, the members of
TPPK now play a larger role. A team from the Institute of Public Services, University
of Lampung, was assigned to assist the team in developing the proposal that will be
presented by the representatives of TPPK at the meeting at sub-district level. This
new mechanism, initiated in 2001, seems to work well.  However, two problems have
arisen.  First is the growing demand of TKKP members for formalizing the team to
allow the members of the team to receive regular payments.  At the time of SMERU’s
visit (July 2002), the local government had not responded to this demand.  The other
problem is regarding the uncertainty of the size or value of projects to be proposed
and government commitment to implement the projects that have been approved.
In 2001, 80% of the projects were implemented but in 2002 none of the projects were
implemented. The team is currently preparing the proposal for 2003.
Another mechanism is participatory development planning. This initiative involves
various measures, including coordinating meetings on various development issues,
distributing questionnaires to gather public opinion on city development issues and
local radio talk shows. However, the main obstacles to this initiative mainly came
from internal local government institutions.  For example, local government owned
radio stations charge a high price for the talk shows, while private radio stations
allocate the time for free. In addition, the attendance and participation of local
government officials and members of the DPRD at various meetings that discussed
the result of the questionnaires and other development issues were very low.
Intergovernmental Coordination
                                                
8 The SMERU field report (June 2001) on West Lombok revealed an increase in the activity of NGOs
and the community in general in monitoring and controlling the performance of and corruption in
local government and DPRD.  But there is no information on a formal attempt toward an inclusive
decision-making process.
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Another critical question of public service provision in the era of decentralization is
the notion of sharing responsibility across levels of government. This also involves
the intergovernmental coordination mechanism. The decentralization reform
brought about the devolution of most authorities and functions to the district
governments, accompanied by the merging of the regional offices of central
government ministries with offices of the regional governments.  These alterations
have curtailed the pre-decentralization coordination and planning mechanisms.  At
the central level, the central government ministries lost significant control over
development in the regions. In addition, channels for local government are also
missing, making it very difficult for them to access information, programs and
assistance available at the center as well as to convey local needs.
The lack of upward and downward channels is complicated by the confusion in the
planning process between different levels of government.  This problem is reflected
in the lack of connection between various planning documents developed at the
central, regional and local level. For example, West Lombok developed its Basic
Development Plan (Poldas) based on the State Guidelines (GBHN), and based on
this Poldas it developed a Strategic Plan (Renstra) and Regional Development
Program (Propeda) that basically contained the same issues. These planning
documents, however, do not make any reference to the national and provincial
planning document –Propenas and the Provincial Development Program (Propeda
Propinsi). This also happened in Bandar Lampung, but the provincial Propeda, in
general, was in line with the city Propeda.
This situation has forced local government officials to approach and lobby the central
government individually and in many cases bypass the provincial government.
Informal processes such as these could potentially lead to a high cost economy and
non-transparent allocation of the central government’s development projects that are
vulnerable to rent seeking activities. Rich regions that can afford the cost of
approaching and lobbying the central ministries may benefit at the expense of the
poorer regions.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The implementation of decentralization reform, complemented by democratization,
has overhauled the entire system of governance that influences not only the way
local, provincial and central government interact, but also the way the government
interacts with the people. This transition is a difficult and time-consuming process,
and it faces many challenges from various interests that could divert the reform
process from its ultimate goal.  This study highlights the slow and fragile institutional
evolution that is taking place at the local level.
The SMERU field studies have uncovered the fact that despite the many weaknesses
in the implementation of decentralization and the misconduct of local governments
and DPRDs, decentralization and democratization reform has resulted in induced the
birth and growth of various forms of public participation.  However, by any means,
these are still at an embryonic stage. Meanwhile, the practice in budgeting,
coordination and the increase in public participation have not yet provided a strong
base for at least maintaining the pre-decentralization level of public service
deliveries.  This implies that there is a need to guard the decentralization reform not
only by action at the local level, but also by various measures at the national level,
and this could mean a continuous adjustment to the decentralization framework.
Adjusting the current decentralization framework by means of amending the current
decentralization laws – Law 22/1999 and Law 25/ 1999 – has been pursued as the
only way of correcting the loopholes within the current framework.  However, given
the lack of trust of the regional governments in the central government’s attitude
towards decentralization, the central government’s effort to amend the laws became
politically contentious.  The dynamics of the implementation at the local level,
however, revealed that while there is a need to amend the decentralization laws to
allow for a better political system to work at the local level, there are also lots more
aspects that would be determined more by non-formal institutions.  The inclusion of
community involvement in decision making process, monitoring of local government
performance, as well as the notion of coordination between levels of government are
the most sensible examples of the things that would not be cured only by amending
the laws.
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ANNEX 1.
Location of SMERU’s Studies on Regional Autonomy, 2000 – 2003
Province District
GRDP per
capita 1999
(thousand Rp.)
HDI
1999
HPI
1998
Poverty
Rate (%),
1999 Time of Visit
Preparation Study
West Java Sukabumi (City)                   1,022       63.2      15.5              7.2 April 2000
Central Java Kudus                   4,433       66.0      25.4            14.6 November 2000
East Java Magetan                      901       64.7      16.7            32.0 October 2000
West Sumatra Solok                   1,174       61.6      24.6              8.7 July 2000
West Nusa Tenggara West Lombok                      852       49.9      39.0            36.6 May/June 2000
West Kalimantan Sanggau                   1,481       61.0      46.5            34.1 September 2000
South Kalimantan Banjarmasin (City)                   2,301       67.1      14.3              5.5 August/Sept 2000
Implementation Study
North Sumatra Karo                   2,803       69.1      21.7              5.0 February/March 2001
Simalungun                   2,538       65.1      20.2            20.8 February/March 2001
Deli Serdang                   1,799       66.1      26.3            10.5 February/March 2001
East Nusa Tenggara East Sumba                      825       55.7      29.1            27.2 September 2001
North Sulawesi Minahasa                   1,642       69.3      17.5              7.5 May 2001
Bolmong                   1,144       66.9      19.5            15.1 May 2001
Gorontalo                   1,504       63.3      32.2            40.1 May 2001
Implementation and Impact Study
Lampung Bandar Lampung                   1,952       68.5      20.5            10.0 June/July 2002
West Nusa Tenggara West Lombok                      852       49.9      39.0            36.6 April 2002
Regional Investment Study
West Java Cirebon                      820       61.6      28.1            33.9 October 2001
Garut                   1,026       61.7      28.8            33.8 October 2001
Ciamis                   1,255       64.8      24.9            17.4 October 2001
North Sumatra Karo                   2,803       69.1      21.7              5.0 February/March 2001
Simalungun                   2,538       65.1      20.2            20.8 February/March 2001
Deli Serdang                   1,799       66.1      26.3            10.5 February/March 2001
North Sulawesi Minahasa                   1,642       69.3      17.5              7.5 May 2001
Bolmong                   1,144       66.9      19.5            15.1 May 2001
Gorontalo                   1,504       63.3      32.2            40.1 May 2001
       
